Beyond the Flight Deck

• An on ground emergency needs to be worked. There seems to be no consistent response of crews on when they evacuate, when they blow engine/APU fire bottles. What is the cost of blowing fire bottles? Can we recommend blowing bottles if no engine fire is indicated by the airplane warning systems? What if tower, ARFF, or the cabin crew, see indications of damage or fire? There seems to be very poor coordination between all parties once the airplane stops.

• An issue is communication during emergencies to all involved. Also, captain leadership and decision making in both normal and abnormal situations.

In-flight issues:
• Cockpit to cabin communication is a common thread regarding the outcome of all emergencies. Current intercom systems in most airlines are antiquated compared to new wireless technology. Is there any move afoot to utilize this technology in the near future?

• Good session to get other players input.

• What kind and detail of information in the non normal situation does one group need about the other to facilitate a shared understanding of the situation and improve or facilitate communication?

• Is there a defining line between providing information and troubleshooting to flight crews over the radio? I would prefer not to be vague and leave a flight crew out in the cold. Information should be provided to assist and of course determine severity of situations.

• Check airmen and training captains often act as ATC in simulated training sessions. Would Eurocontrol consider providing guidance for pilots when acting as ATC in simulator and training sessions?

Industry Concern/Topic:
• Encourage industry to include the roles of ATC, dispatch, maintenance, etc. in CRM/Initial/Recurrent training w/regard to EAS. Should also distinguish the difference between emergency and abnormal “procedures” and “situations” in training. Today’s training environment focuses on completing QRH procedures,
while situations should incorporate interaction with others such as dispatch, maintenance, and ATC.

- It seems that dispatch has a significant role in the control of a flight. Given that, it also seems that dispatchers maybe susceptible to pressuring the flight crew to make decisions in where to terminate a flight despite the fact that it may have a negative impact on a safe outcome.

- I wanted to point out that I attended a “captain course” and it was the first time I know of that they had a workshop in which ATC, operations, in flight, dispatch, and maintenance all worked together. All the above mentioned groups had gotten together to discuss various situations. Their responses were written down to use for this Captain course. During the course, the pilots were separated to play the role of one of the 5 groups. As they role-played the situation, they were talking with one another using walkie-talkies (this makes sense because in the “real world” body language is not a factor among most groups). This type of training allowed the pilots to put themselves in the shoes of the other departments (see their focus). It seems that most people here at the Symposium say, more training with the diverse groups is needed, however due to resources and scheduling, it is not possible. I would think that during each groups’ annual training if they could do this exercise, resources should not be affected.
  - can be accomplished during annual training
  - no scheduling problem (different groups don’t have to try to meet up together except the initial group)
  - realistic communication (walkie-talkies)
  - Better understanding of other groups perspective.

I am wondering what the #4 panel thinks of this program. I am also curious to know if this if being done by other, (most) airlines?

Cockpit and Cabin Communication:
- Face to face communication has been eliminated because of the locked cockpit door. Will the remaining methods be adequate?
- How does cockpit workload impact the use of the interphone in an emergency or abnormal situation?
- How are F/As trained to handle situations when they cannot communicate with cockpit?

- Emphasis on airborne decision making involving maintenance, dispatch, cabin crews, and ATC. Who is the primary decision maker during a specific situation? Sometimes it gets confused.
• Standardize controller procedures to handle airplane emergencies worldwide. 
  Standardize ATC checklists for problems worldwide.
• I am also concerned about how the non-standard use of cabin crew and the non-use of 
  cabin crews. There needs to be a worldwide standard of training for cabin crews so all 
  airlines can reliably incorporate cabin crews into procedures.

• Training received by various groups is usually not known (or at least understood) by 
  others. It is vital that pilots, flight attendants, maintenance, dispatch, and ATC each 
  have a sense of the scope of what other’s are doing or able to do.

• ATC does not make hardly any use of simulators for initial or refresher training, 
  unlike their airline counterparts. The FAA needs to start budgeting for using 
  simulators for emergency training.

• Eurocontrol ATC was exemplary. It is a shame that US ATC cannot duplicate.
• Maintenance coordination was probably one of the most important factors in a 
  domestic 32 _ year air carrier pilot career. Dispatch is most important, time 
  permitting, however hub operations and the number of flights per dispatcher is 
  limiting.

• Are any of the airlines developing procedures to deal with SARS, or other infectious 
  diseases? I know that the CDC and the WHO have guidelines, but do individual 
  airline companies have any?

• I have reviewed several NTSB reports…In most, cabin teams and equipment 
  performance was poor. For instance, one case cited old or short elastic straps on 
  oxygen masks. Add that to unreliable emergency lighting, unsure tail cone release and 
  location, etc. In one case, it was even noted that the southern region of the FAA DID 
  NOT even have a Cabin Specialist in place. But this problem reflects a bias against 
  what may be called “Secondary Safety”. Cockpit items receive high levels of 
  attention, cabin items less so. For instance, emergency “Strip Lighting” may have 
  intermittent operation. The mechanic goes back, “Taps” and “Pushes”, and, presto, it 
  works. FOR NOW! LATER?? The point is, these actions reflect a culture and bias. 
  FAA staffing and regulation, airline “minimalist” training, mechanics viewpoint(s), 
  all reflect this contention. If “uniform items” (for flight attendants) are more 
  important than a 7 second tail cone (simulated) release drill, NOTHING will change. 
  There is a huge potential for lifesaving here: to realize it, this (mostly female) 
  profession must become one of professionalism and dignity, with service a REAL 
  secondary job description.
• Should there be a more formal relationship between maintenance, dispatch, and ATC?
• How much training is there for interactions with those beyond the flight deck? Should there be more?
• Are there usability issues with flight manuals as per checklist discussions yesterday?
• Appears to be need to resolve confusion over roles between dispatch, ATC, maintenance control, and the flight deck.